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Critical Legal Ethics 
REVIEW OF LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A 
CRITICAL READER, EDITED BY SUSAN D. CARLE,† FOREWORD BY 
ROBERT W. GORDON.††
 
REVIEWED BY PAUL R. TREMBLAY*
I.  INTRODUCTION 
These days, it is not easy being a progressive lawyer—one of those 
noble folks who choose to work with disadvantaged clients and 
underserved communities.  Not because of the low pay or the diminished 
status that such lawyers may hold within some professional circles—
although both certainly could be considered drawbacks.  And not because 
the job is too tough; being a progressive lawyer is no doubt hard work, but 
it is certainly far more gratifying than most of the alternatives.1  No, being 
a progressive lawyer is tough because of the increasing uncertainty that 
progressive lawyers encounter as they try to make sense of the 
responsibilities inherent to their role.  In the olden days, it seemed like 
lawyers for poor people had a pretty well-defined role in life.  They went 
to court and fought hard to win important rights for their clients.  Of 
course those lawyers faced some hard choices—for example, whether to 
focus on individual client work or on bigger, and often sexier, law reform 
work—but, for the most part, public interest and poverty lawyers were, 
first and foremost, good, creative litigators on behalf of their clients. 
These days, things are not so simple, but they are a whole lot more 
interesting.  Thanks to waves of critical scholarship produced over the past 
25 years about progressive lawyering and the role that law and legal 
institutions generally play in our society, most of the simple role 
conceptions and understandings about public interest and poverty law 
work have been (if you'll excuse the phrase) deconstructed and obliterated.  
Over the past several years, thoughtful scholars have rigorously 
reexamined how lawyers and clients might best work together and how 
power in their working relationships ought to be identified and negotiated.  
Critical thinkers have conceived alternative visions of lawyering practice, 
                                                 
†  Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. 
††  Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale Law School. 
*  Clinical Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  I extend my thanks to Dean 
John Garvey and the Boston College Law School Fund for financial support for this 
project, and to Ben Forsdick, Boston College Law School Class of 2008, and LaKay 
Cornell, Boston College Law School Class of 2009, for their helpful research assistance. 
1.  See Jean Koh Peters, Habit, Story, Delight: Essential Tools for the Public Service 
Advocate, 7 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 17 (2001) (recounting the joys, and travails, of a 
lawyer working in a public interest setting). 
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visions that embrace a greater respect for the power of community;2 
deeper attention to the influences of race, gender, class, and culture on the 
practice of law as well as on the relationship between the professional and 
her client;3 and more honest acknowledgement of the special tensions 
inherent in lawyering for disadvantaged peoples.4  Today, virtually all of 
the previously accepted understandings about what it means to "practice 
law for poor people"5 are contested in some fashion.  And, importantly, 
the traditional dogmas have not yet been replaced by new ones.  The 
sophistication and diversity of the arguments surrounding the role of 
progressive lawyers have prevented new understandings from coalescing.  
The newer developing wisdoms are tentative, and the explorations 
continue apace.  It is therefore a great time to be a progressive lawyer, 
even if the role may not be an entirely comfortable one. 
                                                 
2.  For a sampling of this scholarship, see Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of 
Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 659 (1987-88) [hereinafter Alfieri, Antinomies]; Susan D. Bennett, Lawyering 
for a New Democracy: Little Engines That Could: Community Clients, Their Lawyers, 
and Training in the Arts of Democracy, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 469; Scott L. Cummings & 
Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 
(2001); Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old Neighborhood, 32 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000); Zenobia Lai, Andrew Leong & Chi Chi Wu, The 
Lessons of the Parcel C Struggle: Reflections on Community Lawyering, 6 ASIAN PAC. 
AM. L.J. 1 (2000); Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community 
Lawyering, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 147 (2000). 
3.  See, e.g., John O. Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause 
Lawyering at the Intersection of Race, Space and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927 
(1999); Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby--
LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1585 (1997); Nancy D. 
Polikoff, Am I My Client?: The Role Confusion of a Lawyer Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 443 (1996); David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition and 
Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502 (1998); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical 
Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights 
America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821 (1997).. 
4.  See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Theoretics of Practice: The Integration of Progressive 
Thought and Action: Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 768 (1992); 
Edgar S. Cahn, Reinventing Poverty Law, 103 YALE L.J. 2133 (1994); Deborah Rhode, 
Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 369 
(2004); William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on 
Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
1099 (1994) [hereinafter Simon, Dark Secret]; Ann Southworth, Lawyers and the “Myth 
of Rights” in Civil Rights and Poverty Practice, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 469 (1999); Louise 
G. Trubek, Embedded Practices: Lawyers, Clients and Social Change, 31 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 415 (1996); Lucie E. White, Facing South: Lawyering for Poor 
Communities in the Twenty-First Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 813 (1998). 
5.  Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049, 1049-59 
(1970). 
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The scope of the literature about critical lawyering6 is vast.  With so 
much written and so many ideas in play, interested readers would benefit a 
great deal from anthologies presenting representative samples of 
prominent works in the field.  Unfortunately, few such focused collections 
exist.7  Professor Susan Carle, a legal historian and ethicist from American 
University Washington College of Law, has finally prepared one such 
compilation.  Her textbook, Lawyers’ Ethics and the Pursuit of Social 
Justice: A Critical Reader,8 is a welcome and illuminating contribution to 
the world of critical lawyering scholarship. 
Carle’s textbook assembles forty excerpted articles, essays, and book 
chapters, each critically appraising some specific aspect of lawyering or 
legal education.9  Several of the articles Carle includes are well-known 
classics, and while some others are less familiar, at least to me, they are no 
less valuable.  Each selection makes an important contribution to the rich 
and sophisticated debate currently underway regarding the proper role of 
lawyers who confront the injustices of contemporary society.   
Carle ostensibly focuses on legal ethics in this compendium, but her 
reach is in fact broader than that, and happily so.  Her book has very 
little—indeed, almost nothing—to do with the “typical” subjects of legal 
ethics scholarship including the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,10 
the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers,11 and the substantive law 
of lawyering.  Instead, Carle’s book focuses on tough questions about 
lawyers practicing as noble, justice-seeking actors in a system grossly 
tilted in favor of entrenched and powerful interests.  If this is part of what 
                                                 
6.  In this review I use the terms "progressive" and "critical" interchangeably, 
recognizing that in some other contexts the terms might acquire differing meanings. 
7.  A few important collections offer some exposure to the progressive lawyering and 
cutting edge clinical scholarship.  See, e.g., CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold 
eds., 1998); CLINICAL ANTHOLOGY: READINGS FOR LIVE-CLIENT CLINICS (Alex J. 
Hurder, Frank S. Bloch, Susan L. Brooks & Susan L. Kay eds., 1997) [hereinafter 
CLINICAL ANTHOLOGY]; LAW STORIES (Gary Bellow & Martha Minow eds., 1996); 
MARTHA R. MAHONEY, ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROFESSIONALS, COMMUNITIES, AND 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2003).  Several important freestanding books develop 
discrete critical lawyering ideas in depth.  See, e.g., GERALD P. LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS 
LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); DAVID 
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE 
INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2000); STUART A. 
SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, 
AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A 
THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998). 
8.  LAWYERS’ ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL READER 
(Susan D. Carle ed., NYU Press 2005) [hereinafter LAWYERS’ ETHICS]. 
9.  All but one of the excerpts were previously published elsewhere.  The exception is 
the splendid contribution of David Luban.  See David Luban, Making Sense of Moral 
Meltdowns, in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 355. 
10.  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2004) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
11.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS (2000). 
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we talk about when we talk about legal ethics,12 then her book is indeed an 
ethics text.  But instead of relying on the typical doctrines that most legal 
ethics textbooks do, Carle’s work digs deeply into emerging lawyering 
praxis theories and jurisprudential questions about the nature of social 
justice in a way that few law school texts have attempted. 
Part II of this Review describes the essays and the viewpoints Carle 
has chosen to include in this collection and distills some of the critical 
messages that she hopes students will take away from her text.  Carle has 
chosen wisely, both in terms of the content of the selections and in how 
she presents them.  Most of the important progressive lawyering critiques 
find some air time in her book, and their messages are subtly spread 
among otherwise unconnected readings.  Part III revisits three of the 
book’s more prominent themes, all intertwined cross-currents within the 
writings.  The three chosen in this Review for closer scrutiny are (1) the 
contours of client-centeredness as an orientation for lawyer-client 
associations, (2) the challenges of what we might call community or 
“rebellious lawyering,” and (3) the persistent problem of moral activism.  
Part III of this Review reveals how deftly Carle has highlighted these and 
other contested lawyering theories, but also points out the inevitably 
introductory nature of a compilation like this.  Part IV wraps up with some 
thoughts about how teachers might make the best use of this rich and 
valuable resource. 
II.  THE READINGS 
Carle organizes her essays13 in an unexpected but ultimately useful 
way.  Her editing of the original works is superb.14  Each chapter begins 
                                                 
12.  See Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A 
Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243 (1985) (borrowing his title from 
RAYMOND CARVER, WHAT WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT LOVE (1981)).  
One scholar recently has suggested a very narrow definition of “legal ethics”: “Legal 
ethics, however, is much more circumscribed [than religious and theological ethics].  Its 
core is in codes and rules; it is a technical subject in which one learns, for example, the 
intricacies of conflicts and of reasonable fees; it is tested on multiple choice exams.” 
Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal Ethics, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1253, 1253 (1998).  For a more expansive view, and a disagreement 
with Professor Griffin on her definition, see Thomas D. Morgan, The Relevance of 
Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal Ethics—A Response to Professor Griffin, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1313, 1317 (1998); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux: 
Another Look at Gender, Feminism, and Legal Ethics, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 75 
(1994), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 271 [hereinafter Menkel-
Meadow, Portia Redux] (“broadly defined ‘legal ethics’” includes “leading our lives as 
lawyers, making decisions about our clients, our opponents, ourselves, and our families, 
searching to be ‘good lawyers’ as well as ‘good people’”).
13.  For simplicity’s sake, in this review I shall often refer to each of the excerpted 
selections as an “essay,” even though few of them would have been labeled essays in 
their original versions.  With Carle’s distilling the lengthy pieces into 7-12 pages of 
insight and argument, the extracts as they appear in the book read as essays. 
2006] CRITICAL LEGAL ETHICS 5 
with a very helpful introduction by Carle about her goals in including the 
selections in that chapter and how they might relate, followed by a series 
of questions for the reader to consider.  She organizes the readings into 
two broad parts: one labeled “Theory and History” and the other 
“Contemporary Critical Approaches”; the former reads somewhat as 
background to the spirited debates found in the latter.  As is true with so 
much of this book, the segments intersect in intriguing ways.  Important 
themes that emerge in the historical background section play a key role in 
the later discussion of the contemporary struggles about proper lawyering 
roles and responsibilities.15
Within “Theory and History,” Carle first offers four articles that 
critically appraise the legal profession’s regulatory schemes and the 
justifications for its monopoly status.  She begins with a classic, and quite 
cynical, commentary by Richard Abel,16 who argues that the American 
Bar Association’s ethics codes and rules serve no purpose other than to 
reinforce and legitimate the profession’s monopoly power.  Carle balances 
the Abel argument with a somewhat more hopeful, if still critical, 
sociological argument from Terence Halliday,17 who argues that lawyer 
regulation and monopoly reflects “an implicit concordat between states 
and established professions,” by which the professions agree to provide 
important public services in return for their notable advantages.18  With 
those divergent orientations in place, Carle then offers David Wilkins’s 
                                                                                                                         
14.  Carle’s ability to cull small fragments of longer pieces and leave a coherent, 
readable product is indeed impressive.  While any reader familiar with a piece’s full text 
can quibble about what ideas Carle has chosen to include and what parts she has omitted, 
for the most part (there are a couple of exceptions) the edited readings flow gracefully 
and articulately. 
15.  In preparation of this review, I have opted to read the essays as they appear in their 
abridged form in Carle's book, and not to read each piece in its original text.  I had read 
many of the original articles or books in the past, but certainly not all of them, and any 
previous reading tended to be some years ago.  I chose to focus exclusively on Carle's 
edited selections in order to situate myself as close to the role of a new reader as possible, 
and to discern from the excerpts what Carle has presented for us.  Some of my comments 
below will reflect that orientation, as, for instance, when I evaluate a piece's limited 
explication of a certain point without acknowledging whether the original text had 
offered more depth. 
16.  Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 
639 (1981), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 18.  As I refer to each of the 
pieces in this anthology, I shall cite to its original source and thereafter refer to it in its 
form and location within Carle’s book. 
17.  TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers, State Crises, and 
Professional Empowerment, in BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND 
PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT, reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 25.  I 
found the Halliday piece to be one of the two least accessible pieces in the collection—
not because of a shortcoming in Carle’s editing skill, but because of Halliday’s  cramped 
writing style, at least to my eye.  (As we see below, the other similarly challenging essay 
is the selection by Anthony Alfieri.  See infra note 159.) 
18.  Id. at 29. 
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account of four types of lawyer regulation and his assertions about the 
essential role of context in any consideration of controls over lawyer 
behaviors.19  This theme of contextual reasoning remains a central one for 
the remainder of the book.   
Another pivotal focus of the book’s remaining essays appears in Lucy 
White’s article about structuralist and Foucaultian visions of power 
relationships.20  Following three essays explicitly about professional 
regulation, White’s meditation at first seems out of place, but it is hardly 
so.  By introducing Foucault’s theories about the shifting, unpredictable 
quality of power, challenging more simplistic traditional visions of the 
powerful on one side and the powerless on the other, White’s article 
begins a process of unsettling accepted wisdoms and resisting categorical 
thinking that becomes quite important later in the book. 
Carle next turns to historical accounts of the profession’s development 
from the early 19th century to the present.  Some of these essays present 
essentially descriptive history, including pieces by Clay Smith,21 Susan 
Carle,22 and Genna Rae MacNeil23 about the lawyers and the tactics of the 
early NAACP.  Carle also includes two articles that discuss important 
Black women lawyers in the early 20th century by Virginia Drachman24 
and Kenneth Mack25 and two other articles by Jerold Auerbach26 and 
                                                 
19.  David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1992), 
reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 31. 
20.  Lucie E. White, Seeking the Faces of Otherness, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499 (1992), 
reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 41 [hereinafter White, Seeking the Faces 
of Otherness].  In this essay White describes and defends "a new field of critical 
reflection on advocacy and pedagogy—a 'theoretics of practice,'" id. at 43, which, 
emerging from theories developed by Clifford Geertz and Michel Foucault, establishes 
the fluidity of power and the possibility of collaboration resistance among those 
otherwise deemed powerless.  White suggests that progressive lawyers may learn a great 
deal from the theoretics of practice movement about navigating the power relationships 
between the professional and her clients, and between those clients and the structural 
institutions affecting their lives. 
21.  J. Clay Smith Jr., Emancipation, in EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK 
LAWYER 1844-1944, (1993), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 109. 
22.  Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 
20 LAW AND HIST. REV. 97 (2002), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 114. 
23.  Genna Rae MacNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for 
Civil Rights, in GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS (1990), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 120. 
24.  Virginia G. Drachman, The New Woman Lawyer and the Challenge of Gender 
Equality in Early Twentieth-Century America, 28 IND. L. REV. 227 (1995), reprinted in 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 85. 
25.  Kenneth W. Mack, A Social History of Everyday Practice: Sadie T.M. Alexander 
and the Incorporation of Black Women into the American Legal Profession, 1925-1960, 
87 CORNELL L. REV. 1405 (2002), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 92. 
26.  JEROLD S. AUERBACH, A Stratified Profession, in UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS 
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 40 (1976), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, 
supra note 8, at 79. 
2006] CRITICAL LEGAL ETHICS 7 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow27 which offer a sociological view of the 
stratification and power imbalances in the profession in the past centuries.  
Other offerings in this section of the textbook are best labeled as 
intellectual histories—or glimpses thereof.  Four essays address historical 
understandings of the “republican”28 vision of the role of a lawyer.  
Russell Pearce argues that early legal ethics writing was quite republican 
in its ethos,29 while Norman Spaulding is less persuaded.30  Robert 
Gordon connects the early republican visions of civic virtue to the lawyer 
elites, whose wealth and power permitted a more independent professional 
philosophy, one less tied to client self-interest.31  And Clyde Spillenger 
acknowledges a republican strain in the work of Louis Brandeis, but with 
                                                 
27.  Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes 
in the Economics, Diversification, and Organization of Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 621 (1994), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 99 [hereinafter 
Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash]. 
28.  As used in the historical chapters of this book, the phrase "civic republican" tends 
to correspond to the more contemporary phrase "moral activism," in connoting a vision of 
lawyering committed to the virtuous ideals of a community and resistant to individual 
client claims when those claims portend harm to the larger community.  Writers often 
employ the phrase in that general spirit, although at times with emphases different from 
those found here.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power and the 
Struggle for Dialogic Standards in Postmodern Constitutional Jurisprudence: 
Michelman, Habermas, and Civic Republicanism, 81 GEO. L.J. 2243, 2249 (1993) 
(describing a similar notion of civic republican thought, as "the potential for virtuous 
citizens to engage in a political dialogue that generates public values and identifies a 
common good"); Peter Margulies, The Mother with Poor Judgment and Other Tales of 
the Unexpected: A Civic Republican View of Difference and Clinical Legal Education, 88 
NW. U. L. REV. 695, 696-97 (1994) (stressing the importance of narrative in civic 
republican conceptions and noting “[c]ivic republicanism is a political theory based on 
popular participation in dialogue about the common good”).  Feldman's description of 
civic republicanism correlates well with another prominent theme of the Carle book, that 
of the power of narrative as a source of ethical meaning.  Compare Feldman, supra, at 
2248 ("Dialogic politics ... generates or produces public values and legal norms: politics, 
in short, is jurisgenerative."), with Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics 
of Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991), reprinted in 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 295, 304 ("We must actively engage the full breadth 
and depth of [our clients'] narratives to honestly and effectively further our analysis.  
What we will come to know as a result of this inquiry will be altered by the 
contextualized process through which we have come to know it. . . . [S]uch a theory-
building practice is a distinctly ethical project."). 
29.  Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics 
Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 242 (1992), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, 
at 53 [hereinafter Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins]. 
30.  Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogating the 
Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2003), reprinted in 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 61. 
31.  Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988), 
reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 66 [hereinafter Gordon, Independence of 
Lawyers]. 
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a more critical eye than one usually encounters in writings about 
Brandeis.32
The remaining two “historical” pieces in this section of Carle’s book 
are landmark writings about the tensions inherent in public interest work.  
The first, by Derrick Bell, criticizes the ethical choices made by 
desegregation lawyers in the 1960s and 1970s for their disconnection to 
client community viewpoints.33  The second is a classic essay by Gary 
Bellow and Jeanne Kettleson (now Jeanne Charn) which canvasses ethical 
frictions that emerged within the poverty law movement of the 1970s.34   
These two selections presage later discussions in the textbook about client-
centeredness, moral activism, and community lawyering. 
The second section of Carle’s textbook is more inclusive than the first.  
Her label, “Contemporary Critical Approaches,” serves as an umbrella for 
everything else she wants to include after the historically-focused 
introduction.  Carle explores a number of important critical perspectives 
under this second heading.  She opens with a subchapter that she calls 
“Clinical Approaches,” by which she means perspectives arising from the 
experiences of clinical law professors and their developing scholarship.35  
The label is of course broadly flexible, as clinicians have been writing 
about nearly every aspect of lawyering theory and practice over the past 
30 years.  But the inclusion of these perspectives is a welcome 
acknowledgement to the always-underappreciated clinical world.   
Carle presents two such clinical approaches in this subchapter.  The 
first, which Carle calls “client-centered/collaborative lawyering,” includes 
excerpts from four well-known articles, each offering a general embrace 
                                                 
32.  Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s Lawyer, 
105 YALE L.J. 1445 (1996), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 72.  
Commentators frequently cite Brandeis favorably for his early championing of a more 
socially responsible lawyering ethics.  See, e.g., John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as 
Intermediaries: The Representation of Multiple Clients in the Modern Legal Profession, 
1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 744; LUBAN, supra note 7, at 237-38 (praising the "Brandeisian 
vision of moral activism"); David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice 
of Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717, 720-35 (1988); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of 
Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 980 (1987); William H. Simon, Babbitt v. 
Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565, 565-66 (1985). 
33.  Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests 
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976), reprinted in LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS, supra note 8, at 128. 
34.  Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity 
and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REV. 337 (1978), reprinted in 
LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 136.  The Bellow and Kettleson article is an 
important contribution and easily warrants inclusion in Carle’s collection, but its 
placement within the “historical” chapter seems odd.  While the article was written many 
years ago (close to thirty years as I write), it neither describes a historical development 
nor captures the profession at a particular moment in time.  Indeed (and this may be a 
sobering realization), the issues raised so elegantly by Gary Bellow and Jeanne Charn in 
1978 remain just as relevant today and have not been resolved to anyone’s satisfaction. 
35.  LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 145. 
2006] CRITICAL LEGAL ETHICS 9 
and constructive critique of the client-centeredness model of lawyer-client 
interaction.36  Robert Dinerstein examines the interpersonal and ethical 
underpinnings of the deep-rooted client-centered stance.37  Lucy White38 
and Binny Miller39 each use affecting client stories to test the practice of 
collaboration.  In the final excerpt, Michelle Jacobs criticizes the neutral, 
autonomy-focused qualities of client-centered counseling for 
marginalizing clients of color.40  Collaborating with clients, rather than 
lawyering for clients, is an important characteristic of progressive clinical 
scholarship, and these four pioneering pieces afford students a few 
important glimpses into the unsettling challenges of such a seemingly 
simple prescription.41   
The second clinical approach explored in Carle’s book represents a 
strand of scholarship that may be in tension with the “client-
centered/collaborative” model.  Carle calls this approach 
“community/rebellious lawyering,”42 and, as its name implies, its 
adherents resist much of the client-centeredness model of lawyering 
which, they argue, places too much emphasis on the individual client.  The 
                                                 
36.  While thoughtful critics have continued to refine its understandings, the central 
premise of client-centeredness—that lawyers ought to respect the ultimate choices of 
their clients, rather than seek to impose their own choices, on questions of legal 
objectives as well as tactics—has become established doctrine within the academy.  See 
Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered 
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 370-71 (2006) (“[T]he client-centered 
approach remains the predominant model for teaching lawyering skills. . . . [I]t is not an 
exaggeration to say that client-centered representation is one of the most influential 
doctrines in legal education today.”).  Client-centeredness as a model for lawyering work 
is widely attributed to the pathbreaking work of David Binder and Susan Price.  See 
DAVID BINDER & SUSAN PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-
CENTERED APPROACH (1977). 
37.  Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 
32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 151. 
38.  Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: 
Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990), reprinted in LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS, supra note 8, at 157 [hereinafter White, Sunday Shoes]. 
39.  Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in Case 
Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 
169. 
40.  Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-
Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 345 (1997), reprinted in LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS, supra note 8, at 181. 
41. I explore this particular topic at greater length in Part III of this review. 
42.  LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 187.  Carle notes that many scholars in this area 
understand the terms “collaborative” and "community” lawyering as referring to the same 
approaches.  Id., Introduction, at 5.  See, e.g., Ascanio Piomelli, The Democratic Roots of 
Collaborative Lawyering, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 541, 544-45 (2006) (choosing 
“collaborative” to capture the terms “community,” “mobilization,” and "rebellious”).  
Carle is correct to separate the labels, though, as the comparison between the White and 
Miller pieces and the López piece in this book tend to show.  See infra text 
accompanying notes 89-148. 
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book includes three excerpts here, starting with a chapter from Gerald 
López’s pioneering work, The Rebellious Idea of Lawyering Against 
Subordination, which established “rebellious lawyering” within the 
lexicon of the critical scholarship world.43  López distinguishes those good 
faith, earnest, but ultimately ineffectual regnant lawyers, who use their 
considerable skill and dedication to try to achieve legal advances for their 
disadvantaged clients, from the more creative, community-based 
rebellious lawyers, who eschew traditional litigation and legislative 
advocacy in favor of organized resistance and lay advocacy.44  López’s 
piece is followed by two more focused examples of community lawyering, 
one describing lawyering stories from the Pueblo of Isleta in New 
Mexico45 and the other telling a tale of organizing and advocacy within 
the Hmong communities of Northern California.46  Whether either of these 
excerpts in fact presents a truly “rebellious” vision of lawyering is a 
question that students will want to consider carefully, and one which this 
Review addresses below.47  In addition to offering students concrete 
examples of alternative visions of working with and for discrete 
communities, the Cruz and Hwang essays reprise a significant topic for 
progressive legal practice, one developed in the earlier essay by Michelle 
Jacobs,48 namely the role of cross-cultural competence in effective 
lawyering.49
Carle’s next chapter, which she labels “Critical Theories” in 
recognition of the influences of Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race 
Studies, and the body of work popularly referred to as “LatCrit”50 and 
                                                 
43.  Gerald P. López, The Rebellious Idea of Lawyering Against Subordination, in 
REBELLIOUS LAWYERING, supra note 7, reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 
187. 
44.  Id.   
45.  Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous 
Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557 (1999), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 
8, at 201. 
46.  Victor M. Hwang, The Hmong Campaign for Justice: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 
9 ASIAN L.J. 83 (2002), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 210. 
47.  See infra text accompanying notes 128-48. 
48.  Jacobs, supra note 40. 
49.  The Jacobs, Cruz, and Hwang essays in their distinctive ways argue for cultural 
sensitivity when working with different clients, for the development of cultural 
competence, and for a healthy wariness of stereotyping and “essentializing” at the same 
time.  (The book’s essay by Angela Davis, discussed below (see infra text at note 56), 
addresses essentialism in feminist legal theory, as does Lucy White, see White, Seeking 
the Faces of Otherness, supra note 20, at 43.)  Carle does not, though, include in her 
selections any in-depth discussion of how lawyers (or students) manage that balance in 
their daily client work.  For two sources that attempt such practical advice, see Susan 
Bryant, The Five Habits: Building Cross-Cultural Competence in Lawyers, 8 CLINICAL 
L. REV. 33, 99 (2001); Paul R. Tremblay & Carwina Weng, Multicultural Lawyering: 
Heuristics and Biases, in THE AFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: PRACTICING LAW AS 
A HEALING PROFESSION (Marjorie A. Silver, ed., forthcoming 2006). 
50.  See, e.g., Espinoza & Harris, supra note 3. 
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“FemCrit”51 studies upon the development of “subversive,”52 cutting edge 
visions of lawyering practice and ethics, consists of nine essays.  Carle 
chooses two essays from the substantial body of scholarship belonging to 
the field known as Critical Legal Studies (CLS).  While the first, a classic 
work by Peter Gabel and Paul Harris,53 clearly fits within the CLS label, 
the other, William Simon’s groundbreaking article on ethical discretion in 
lawyering,54 is a less obvious member of the CLS genre.55  Carle follows 
                                                 
51.  See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, 
and Legal Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 
(1988).  For an assessment of the emerging subgroups within Critical Legal Studies, see 
Jerry L. Anderson, Law School Enters The Matrix: Teaching Critical Legal Studies, 54 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 201 (2004) ("[T]he [Critical Legal Studies] movement has now 
fragmented, to a large extent, into various interest groups of 'outsiders'—RaceCrits, 
LatCrits, QueerCrits, FemCrits, and so on—that in many ways have differentiated or 
distanced themselves from the core principles of the original CLS theorists."). 
52.  Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 581 (1990), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 283. 
53.  Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal 
Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 369 (1982-83), 
reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 230. 
54.  William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 
(1988), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 238 [hereinafter Simon, Ethical 
Discretion]. 
55.  While William Simon’s scholarship may comfortably entitle him to membership in 
the CLS club, see, e.g., Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 4; William H. Simon, Visions of 
Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984); William H. Simon, Homo 
Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487, 551-59 (1980); 
William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional 
Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29 (1978); see also Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity 
Coop As A Vehicle For Affordable Housing In A Race And Class Divided Society, 46 
HOW. L.J. 85, 115 (2002) (describing Simon as a "critical legal theorist"), his most 
famous article may seem to some too allied with mainstream legal values to qualify for 
CLS status.  In Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, Simon advocates a “professional duty” 
and a “substantial responsibility for vindicating substantive merits” in legal disputes.  
Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 54, at 238, 243.  The “justice” championed by 
Simon is reflected in the substantive legal merits of a dispute, and is not dependent, 
Simon insists, upon a lawyer's "moral" assessment of the circumstances.  Id. at 243-44.  
Simon's arguments therefore imply an acquiescence in mainstream legal obligations, in 
ways different from the common CLS views describing substantive law's inclination “to 
legitimize a social order that most people find alienating and humane" (Gabel & Harris, 
supra note 53, at 231), and arguing that “the legal system works ... to shape popular 
consciousness toward accepting the political legitimacy of the status quo” (id.).  Scholars 
have critiqued that quality of Simon's jurisprudence, which relies significantly on the 
philosophy of Ronald Dworkin.  See David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 901 (1999) (believing Simon might have "too much faith in law"); 
Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less Than Ideal Legal World, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 973, 984 (1999) ("Do we really want lawyers, as professionals, to identify 
the demands of justice with even an idealized, deep-digging interpretation of extant law?  
Is our law really that good?"). 
Simon does expressly credit his "ethical discretion" ideas not just to Dworkin's 
influence, but also to the arguments developed by the CLS scholars.  See Simon, supra 
note 54, at 247.  Bradley Wendel acknowledges Simon's crediting of CLS but finds it 
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her CLS offerings with three Critical Race Theory pieces by Angela 
Davis,56 Bill Ong Hing,57 and Anthony Alfieri.58  Each of these articles 
addresses the connection between race-consciousness and actual 
lawyering practice.   
Carle completes her review of critical theories with four essays labeled 
“Feminist Theory/Legal Praxis,” despite the fact that all of the critical 
theory essays, indeed most of the offerings in the book, touch on “legal 
praxis” themes.  Her selection of feminist theory essays includes an 
excerpt from Carrie Menkel-Meadow59 on feminism and the developing 
an “ethic of care” in lawyering (contrasted with a more traditional “ethic 
of justice”), Angela Harris’s deliberation on how gender essentialism risks 
silencing the voices of black women,60 Lani Guinier’s review of her 
empirical study of women’s experiences with traditional law school 
training,61 and Phyllis Goldfarb’s elegant linking of feminist jurisprudence 
with the contextual ethical stance emerging from clinical education 
experiences.62
The Critical Theories chapter teases the reader with an assortment of 
subversive ideas—or, ideas that at least seem subversive relative to 
conventional professional responsibility teachings.  The authors included 
in this chapter illuminate the importance of contextual, rather than 
categorical, thinking.  They rebel at the notion that there are simple right 
answers to the problems faced by lawyers and at the idea that there are 
universal rules for lawyers to learn and follow.  Each demands frank 
attention to the effects of power, race, sex, and class in lawyering, but the 
authors refuse, for the most part, to suggest or define rigid protocols to 
which lawyers ought to adhere in their practice,63 a not surprising 
                                                                                                                         
inconsistent with Simon's Dworkinian faith in law's determinate nature.  W. Bradley 
Wendel, Institutional and Individual Justification in Legal Ethics: The Problem of Client 
Selection, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 987, 1028 (2006) [hereinafter Wendel, Client Selection]. 
56.  Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 13 (1998), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 245. 
57.  Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer’s Duty to 
Work for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901 (1995), reprinted in LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS, supra note 8, at 258. 
58.  Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)race-ing an Ethic of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 935 (1999), 
reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 265 [hereinafter Alfieri, Ethic of Justice]. 
59.  Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, supra note 12, at 274. 
60.  Harris, supra note 52, at 283. 
61.  Lani Guinier, Lessons and Challenges of Becoming Gentlemen, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 1 (1998), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 289. 
62.  Goldfarb, supra note 28, at 295. 
63.  The exception might be Angela Davis and Bill Ong Hing, two writers considered 
Critical Race Theorists, each of whom proposes new rules for lawyers requiring explicit 
attention to race in certain lawyering settings.  See Davis, supra note 56, at 246 
(proposing “the use of racial impact studies in prosecution offices to advance the 
responsible, nondiscriminatory exercise of prosecutorial discretion”); Hing, supra note 
57, at 261-62 (proposing “a specific set of rules and guidelines that lawyers would be 
obligated to follow in cases involving, or potentially involving, racial and ethnic tension,” 
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conclusion given their resistance to categorical approaches to the fluid and 
often messy world of practice.  These authors, like others featured in the 
book, intimate a deep skepticism about traditional zealous advocacy roles 
for lawyers out of a concern either for the lawyers’ clients—who may 
prefer or prosper under an alternative, less adversarial stance—or for those 
third parties on the receiving end of adversarial tactics, notwithstanding 
the clients’ preferences.  They also imply an approach to moral truth 
which favors dialogue and care over a hierarchy of rules and principles.64
Carle follows these critical theory selections, which make up the most 
substantial segment of the book, with three shorter chapters that veer away 
from the critical.  Instead, these chapters offer insights about lawyering 
practice from important contemporary perspectives.  The title of Chapter 
6, “Legal Ethics Exploration through Literature, Myth, and Popular 
Culture,” is a rather ambitious heading for two pieces.  The first of these is 
Paul Bergman’s entertaining frolic through classic films about redemptive 
legal practice;65 the second is an important article by Rob Atkinson that 
connects Kazuo Ishiguro’s The Remains of the Day66 (the book, not the 
movie) to themes emanating from the moral activism debate percolating 
within various strains of legal ethics literature.67  Neither of these essays 
specifically addresses the interplay between popular culture’s visions of 
lawyers and the roles that lawyers adopt in their working lives—although 
Bergman’s piece comes close.68  Instead, these pieces serve to connect 
themes that appear elsewhere in Carle’s book—including client-
centeredness, moral activism, and justice—to the stories encountered in 
the films and literature explored by Bergman and Atkinson. 
Chapter 7 confronts a topic that is increasingly debated within the 
legal ethics community: the role of religious commitment on the proper 
functioning of a good lawyer.  In this chapter, entitled “Legal Ethics and 
                                                                                                                         
including requiring alternative dispute resolution in cases where the parties “are of 
different racial or ethnic groups”). 
64.  Carol Gilligan’s work, not surprisingly, is an important, but critically appraised, 
influence within this book.  See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (1982), referred to in Menkel-
Meadow, Portia Redux, supra note 12, at 274; Goldfarb, supra note 28, at 297. 
65.  Paul Bergman, The Movie Lawyers’ Guide to Redemptive Legal Practice, 48 
UCLA L. REV. 1393 (2001), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 309. 
66.  KAZUO ISHIGURO, THE REMAINS OF THE DAY (1990). 
67.  Rob Atkinson, How the Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted Professionalism 
of THE REMAINS OF THE DAY, 105 YALE. L.J. 177 (1995), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, 
supra note 8, at 317. 
68.  Carle cites to some articles offering that perspective in her Appendix, for students’ 
further reading on this topic.  See Anthony Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular 
Culture, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 527 (1986); Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The 
Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 
805 (1998); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can They Do That?  Legal Ethics in Popular 
Culture: Of Character and Acts, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1305 (2001). 
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Religious Commitment,” Carle presents three essays by Stephen Carter,69 
Russell Pearce,70 and Thomas Shaffer.71  The essays she has chosen are 
interesting, readable, and provocative.  Each addresses an important 
question about good lawyering, but none grapples directly with what 
seems to be a most important question within this realm: whether religious 
values are in some way independent of, or add to, the moral values 
attendant to the lawyering questions explored in each essay.72  It is also 
noteworthy, although perhaps not unexpected given the book's 
commitment to social justice from a progressive perspective, that Carle 
has included three essays from the left of the political spectrum, and none 
from the right, whose views would have the potential and propensity to 
use religious commitment to develop some very different conceptions of 
good lawyering.73
The book’s final chapter joins the ongoing debate about legal ethics 
and the posture of lawyers working for powerful corporate interests.  
Entitled “Future Challenges: Corporate Power and Lawyers’ Counseling 
Role,” Chapter 8 includes two essays about Enron authored by two of the 
leading lights in the academy, David Luban and Robert Gordon.  Luban’s 
essay74 revisits some of the arguments about moral responsibility that he 
first developed more than twenty years ago, but within the framework of 
the sobering practical experience of the corporate scandals of the past 
decade, all of which involved lawyers in central ways.  Luban persists in 
his defense of activism, of course, but he recognizes that powerful 
institutional and psychological forces operate to undercut its practical 
                                                 
69.  Stephen Carter, Panel Discussion: Does Religious Faith Interfere with a Lawyer’s 
Work?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 985 (1999), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, 
at 329. 
70.  Russell G. Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer’s Question, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1259 
(1996), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 339 [hereinafter Pearce, Jewish 
Lawyer’s Question]. 
71.  Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Serve the Guilty?, 23 GA. L. REV. 
1201 (1989), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 343. 
72.  For an insightful article touching on the relationship between Jesuit training and 
teaching good lawyering, see Gregory A. Kalscheur, Law School as a Culture of 
Conversation: Re-Imagining Legal Education as a Process of Conversion to the 
Demands of Authentic Conversation, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 333, 366-70 (1996). 
73.  See, e.g., John J. Fitzgerald, Today's Catholic Law Schools in Theory and Practice: 
Are We Preserving Our Identity?, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 245, 245 
(2001) ("the Catholic law schools that train future lawyers have a fundamental 
responsibility to take up Christ's call so that they may in turn inculcate a sense of 
Christian mission in their students").  Fitzgerald opposes Catholic law schools' teaching 
in support of "contraception, the morality of homosexual acts, and the ordination of 
women." Id. at 253-54; see also David L. Gregory, The Bishop's Role in the Catholic Law 
School, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 23, 27 (1998-1999) (suggesting "that resolute proponents 
of capital punishment or abortion—the secular champions of the culture of death—
[should] no longer be allowed a platform for such gravely immoral activities directly 
within the Catholic law school"). 
74.  Luban, supra note 9. 
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usefulness.75  In the other essay, Gordon76 meditates on the special 
fiduciary role of corporate counsel and offers a bold suggestion, which he 
fears may be an “idle dream.”77  Gordon envisions “a separate 
professional role for a distinct type of lawyer, the Independent Counselor, 
with a distinct ethical orientation, institutionalized in a distinct governance 
regime” of particularized duties, rules and court practices.78  This Review 
will discuss both Luban’s and Gordon’s arguments below in more detail, 
when it considers the activist messages presented by Carle’s textbook.79
With this varied and eclectic mix of 40 essays by 38 scholars, Carle 
offers her readers important but unsettling glimpses into most of the topics 
that a sustained focus on the progressive pursuit of justice requires.  None 
of her topics are developed in great depth in the book, however, and Carle 
no doubt accepts that necessary limitation.  In the end, her book is a 
manageable read, and the essays are edited down to accessible, though still 
challenging, excerpts.  Because any one of the essays excerpted in the 
book could serve as the source of serious, sustained deliberation and 
examination, 40 such articles would result in an unwieldy, excessively 
dense book.  The risks Carle assumed in offering abridged versions of the 
essays were therefore worthwhile.  At the same time, as Part III of this 
Review describes, students using Carle’s textbook will no doubt benefit 
from having a teacher or discussion leader who can mine the numerous 
insights and cross-current themes that emerge through the excerpts and, by 
helping students make connections between these themes, support the 
students’ development of a deeper appreciation for the subtle and 
sophisticated arguments presented in each work.  Focusing on three of the 
more prominent themes that emerge in Carle’s book, the next part of this 
Review will now try to make some of those connections. 
No reader can finish a book like this without wishing that his favorite 
topic received more attention, and I am no exception.  I would have liked 
greater attention to the challenges about the effective delivery of legal 
services to those who cannot afford to pay for them—a “pursuit of social 
justice” theme if there ever was one.  The Bellow and Kettleson essay80 
hints at the extent of the access to justice problems, but does little more 
than that, and while some of the rebellious lawyering essays suggest 
deprofessionalization as one way to reduce the need for lawyers’ services, 
                                                 
75.  Id. at 365-68.  For an understanding of Luban's earlier defense of the activist 
conception, see LUBAN, supra note 7; David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and 
Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen Ellmann, 90 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1004 (1990). 
76.  Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After 
Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185 (2003), reprinted in LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 
371 [hereinafter Gordon, Corporate Counselor]. 
77.  Id. at 383. 
78.  Id. at 381. 
79.  See infra text accompanying notes 149-60. 
80.  Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 34. 
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none explores this idea in depth.  In that same vein, readers encounter 
nothing here about the professional ethical struggles that surround lay 
advocacy,81 or proposals for “unbundled” legal practices82 and other 
cutting edge devices to assist pro se litigants,83 or the ethics of triage 
within public interest and legal services practice.84  The book also offers 
very little inquiry into the recent transformation of the large law firm and 
the emergence of an "eat what you kill" ethos within large, high-status 
legal practice settings.85  Carle has reported that space limitations required 
her to cut some of those very topics;86 a future edition may allow her the 
opportunity to address them. 
III.  THREE RECURRENT THEMES 
This Part of the Review assesses what significant themes students 
might ultimately appreciate from Carle’s textbook.  Part II offered a flavor 
of the disparate points of view that are presented in the book.  However, 
that Part simply introduced these points of view without 
elaborating further.  These disparate points of view thus deserve more 
elaborate consideration.  As noted above, there is simply too much 
material and too many complex and sophisticated arguments covered in 
                                                 
81.  See, e.g., RHODE, supra note 7. 
82.  See, e.g., Mary Helen McNeal, Having One Oar or Being Without a Boat: 
Reflections on the Fordham Recommendations on Limited Legal Assistance, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2617 (1999); Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: 
Unbundling and Moderate-Income Elderly Clients, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295 
(1997); Robert Bickel, Note, Limited Legal Services: Is It Worth It?, 39 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 331 (2006).
83.  See, e.g., Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor: 
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 
(1999); Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of 
Lawyers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REV. 79 (1997). 
84.  The several discussions of the ethical stance involved in "impact lawyering" in the 
readings come close to the questions of triage, but they do not deal with the question, 
noted in passing by Bellow and Kettleson, of how lawyers who have too many clients 
might properly and ethically choose among them.  See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 
34, at 137.  For a discussion of the ethics of triage, see Martha Minow, Lawyering for 
Human Dignity, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 143, 148-61 (2002); Paul R. 
Tremblay, Acting “A Very Moral Type of God”: Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (1999) [hereinafter Tremblay, Triage Among Poor Clients]; 
Wendel, Client Selection, supra note 55, at 1030-32.
85.  Some references to that phenomenon appear in Menkel-Meadow, Culture Clash, 
supra note 27, at 102, and implicitly in Luban, supra note 9, at 361-62.  For some careful 
exploration of the emerging patterns within modern law firm culture, see MARC 
GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS : THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A 
WALL STREET LAWYER (2004). 
86.  LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 7-8 (sharing in the Introduction her publishers’ 
space restrictions and her need, regretfully, to eliminate readings on invidious 
discrimination, mandatory pro bono, and unauthorized practice restrictions). 
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the textbook for most readers to come away from it satisfied.  A thorough 
reading of each essay will no doubt provide insight, but also raise 
important questions, and even cause the reader hesitations, doubts, and 
disagreements.  Each piece is by necessity incomplete: each provokes, but 
does not resolve.87
Three themes surface often enough in the book to warrant deeper 
examination.  This examination will ideally enable me to tease out the 
strands of meaning that accumulate slowly over the course of the book.  
The three themes explored here are client-centeredness, 
rebellious/community lawyering, and moral activism.88   This Part will 
consider how those themes are presented through Carle's selections, and 
examine whether readers who might otherwise be new to those themes are 
likely to leave the text with an adequate understanding of the themes’ 
nuances.   
 A.  CLIENT-CENTERED LAWYERING 
In compiling a textbook on legal ethics and the pursuit of social 
justice, Carle cannot avoid confronting some delicate questions about what 
it means for lawyers to practice in a client-centered way.  Her book 
apportions considerable space to this issue, which was a sensible decision.  
Although Carle includes a sub-chapter labeled “Client-
Centered/Collaborative Lawyering,”89 client-centeredness ideas show up 
in many other parts of the book as well.  The book’s message is decidedly 
ambivalent about this model of lawyering, and for generally wise and 
good reasons. 
Let us begin with a brief précis about this lawyering orientation, the 
acceptance of which is soundly established within clinical teaching and 
                                                 
87.  This is a theme developed by Robert Gordon in his Foreword to the Carle book.  
See Robert W. Gordon, Foreword to LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at xiii-xvi 
[hereinafter Gordon, Foreward]. 
88.  The three areas I chose to discuss are not the only ones I could have identified, 
although they are perhaps the most prominent over the course of Carle's book.  Another 
prevalent perspective in the book is one of the contingency and fluidity of power, a 
message developed here with homage to the teachings of, among others, Michel Foucault 
and Audre Lorde.  See, e.g., LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 2; Goldfarb, supra note 
28, at 304; Harris, supra note 52, at 285; López, supra note 43, at 198; Mack, supra note 
25, at 97 (quoting Audre Lorde: "Can the master's tools dismantle the master's house?"); 
White, Seeking the Faces of Otherness, supra note 20, at 42; White, Sunday Shoes, supra 
note 38, at 166.  Carle's book also evidences a less prominent but still frequent 
questioning of the propriety of lawyers violating some rules in the interests of some 
greater, justice-driven good.  See LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 149; Bell, supra 
note 33, at 130; Gabel & Harris, supra note 53, at 234; Hwang, supra note 46, at 222; and 
Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, supra note 12, at 280. 
89.  LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 145 (including the essays by Dinerstein, supra 
note 37; Jacobs, supra note 40; Miller, supra note 39; and White, Sunday Shoes, supra 
note 38). 
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lawyering scholarship.90  In its crude formulation, client-centeredness 
rests on simple truths about the agency, and moral, relationship between a 
lawyer and her client.91  As Mark Spiegel pointed out many years ago, it is 
incoherent to look for meaningful distinctions between substance and 
procedure in lawyering work.92  The traditional liberal notion that clients 
choose the ends in their legal relationships, and lawyers choose the means, 
is unsustainable.93  As first crafted by David Binder and Susan Price, the 
client-centered model rejected that traditional formulation and allocated 
essentially all lawyering decisions to clients, except those which are 
purely functionary and logistical.94  That conception makes good sense, at 
least until several problematic nuances arise.  For example, lawyers are 
agents, and clients principals.  Principals hire the agents, and direct their 
work.  Therefore, according to the nature of their agency relationship, 
lawyers can never know clients’ preferences and wishes as well as clients 
themselves do.95
Carle’s essays do not develop fully the primitive model of client-
centeredness just described.96  And although students using this text in a 
clinical program will almost assuredly have encountered that rudimentary 
formulation, those studying it in a professional responsibility course may 
not have done so.  What readers of Carle’s book will discover, instead, are 
several questions that critical scholars pose about the apparently sensible 
client-centeredness orientation.   
As previously indicated, the essays in this book collectively 
underscore the significance of context, contingency, and skepticism in 
lawyering and in relationships.97  That theme is quite apparent in the 
book’s treatment of client-centeredness.  Robert Dinerstein, in the excerpt 
Carle includes in her book, highlights at least two important doubts about 
                                                 
90.  See Dinerstein, supra note 37, at 152; Jacobs, supra note 40, at 181; Kruse, supra 
note 36, at 370-71. 
91.  See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and 
the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 67 (1979).  Client-centeredness emerges 
from traditional agency conceptions because, as an agent for her principal, a lawyer owes 
a fiduciary duty to follow the principal's wishes.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 
385 (1958); James Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law and the Characterization "Officer 
of the Court," 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349, 403 (2000).  It also emerges from the moral 
commitment to the client's right to autonomy and to be free from unwanted paternalism.  
See Kruse, supra note 36, at 400. 
92.  Spiegel, supra note 91, at 71-72. 
93.  Dinerstein points out that this false distinction survives in the allocation of 
decisionmaking.  Dinerstein, supra note 37, at 155-56; see MODEL RULES Rule 1.4.  
94.  BINDER & PRICE, supra note 36.  David Binder and Susan Price have refined their 
ideas in two later editions of that classic text.  See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN & 
SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991); 
DAVID BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SUSAN PRICE & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, LAWYERS AS 
COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 2004). 
95.  See Kruse, supra note 36, at 378 (summarizing that position). 
96.  See Dinerstein, supra note 37, at 152-53.
97.  See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. 
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a straightforward, non-contextual vision of client-centeredness.  The early 
commitment to client-centeredness emerged from progressive criticism of 
the traditional lawyer-dominated model of client counseling, an approach 
that withheld from clients a respectful equality and a share of power in the 
relationship.98  But, as Dinerstein reminds us, the commitment to client-
centeredness for lawyers working with powerful clients translates easily 
into a “hired gun” paradigm which amplifies power to those interests “so 
powerful as not to need further empowerment.”99  He hints that lawyers 
ought to withhold client-centeredness from powerful clients, who have less 
need for autonomy and who—the argument implies—will use any 
autonomy to further injustice.100  Dinerstein does not demonstrate in this 
brief excerpt how lawyers might accomplish that feat, and indeed the 
suggestion seems rather visionary.  But his suggestion alludes to a second, 
related criticism of client-centerednesss, a critique that will tie into a later 
theme of Carle’s book that this Review will next examine: that of moral 
activism. 
Client-centeredness serves as a vehicle to enhance a client’s 
autonomy—the right of the client to control her life and her affairs.  
However, that reality can trigger important moral questions when clients 
opt to use their lawyers’ services for unjust ends.  Any defense of client-
centeredness must craft a distinction between respect for a client’s 
preferences (which are idiosyncratic to the client) and respect for the 
client’s moral choices (which are decidedly not, unless one accepts a 
purely relativist outlook).  Dinerstein perceives this concern, but does not 
elaborate on it in the excerpt provided by Carle in the book.  In the 
excerpt, Dinerstein does imply that lawyers ought to be humble in their 
moral assessment of client choices, lest lawyers “impos[e] their values” on 
their clients.101  This argument invites, but does not receive in the book, a 
spirited rejoinder.102
                                                 
98.  See Kruse, supra note 36, at 375; Spiegel, supra note 91, at 49-72. 
99.  Dinerstein, supra note 37, at 154. 
100.  Id.  
101.  Id. at 156. 
102.  Dinerstein’s resistance to lawyers’ imposition of values on clients materializes in 
his criticism of William Simon’s Ethical Discretion in Lawyering.  See id. at 156 (citing 
Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 54).  His criticism as it appears here is not fully 
persuasive, however.  Dinerstein worries about Simon’s lawyers’ “denying [clients] the 
opportunity at least to seek vindication of hypothetically legal interests.”  Dinerstein, 
supra note 37, at 156.  If by “hypothetically” Dinerstein means “unmeritorious,” then 
Simon indeed would suggest such a denial, but for good reason.  If by “hypothetically” 
Dinerstein means “possibly justified,” then he mischaracterizes Simon’s position, which 
calls for the exercise of ethical discretion only when, in the lawyer's judgment, the lack of 
legal merit is clear.  See Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 54, at 239-40.  Simon also 
does not argue that lawyers should “impose” any “values” on clients, although he does 
argue that lawyers must share the value of respect for the legal merits of a dispute.  See 
id. at 244 (resisting what Simon calls "the specious law-versus-morality characterization" 
of moral activism). 
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In addition to highlighting worries about the client-centered 
approach’s propensity to support powerful interests and to sustain immoral 
enterprises, Carle’s book exposes its readers to the cultural imperialism 
that some client-centered literature invokes.  Michele Jacobs warns about 
that danger: 
The irony of the [client-centered] models is that they were 
constructed to return the client to the centrality of the 
lawyer’s work.  Yet, even with the best of intentions, 
lawyers most concerned with preserving the autonomy of 
client decision-making have, by adopting the “client-
centered” model of counseling, continued to place the 
client, especially the client of color, out at the margin.103
Jacobs’s excerpt presents a critical, but seemingly misleading, message 
for its readers.  Her essay demonstrates elegantly, even in its abridged 
version, how race-neutral models for interviewing and counseling are apt 
to disappoint and to marginalize clients of color.  More puzzling, however, 
is her argument that by adopting client-centered models lawyers contribute 
to that wrongdoing.104  Is Jacobs suggesting that lawyers ought to reject 
client-centered approaches, in favor of a more paternalistic stance, in order 
to lawyer more effectively across cultures?  That cannot be, and in fact is 
not, her argument.  However, the segment quoted above, which is central 
in the excerpt provided by Carle, tends to mischaracterize her message. 
Jacobs’s disagreement is not so much with the baseline idea of client-
centeredness, or with its premise that lawyers ought to respect the 
preferences of their clients.  Indeed, the thrust of her argument advocates 
more respect for, and greater efforts to understand, what the client holds 
dear, especially (but not exclusively) when the lawyer and the client are 
from different cultures.105  Jacobs’s objections surface not from the 
commitment to respecting client values, but from the “neutral skills”106 
training that early editions of the most prominent interviewing and 
counseling texts seemed to advocate.107  Those books might have been 
                                                 
103.  Jacobs, supra note 40, at 181 (emphasis added). 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. at 184. 
106.  Id. at 182. 
107.  In her original article, Jacobs reviewed the messages, implicit and explicit, of two 
leading interviewing and counseling textbooks at that time.  See Jacobs, supra note 40, at 
353-61 (reviewing BINDER, BERGMAN & PRICE, supra note 94, and ROBERT M. 
BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, AND NEGOTIATING: 
SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION (1990)).  No doubt in response to reviews like 
Jacobs’s, later skills texts have attempted to address the question of cross-cultural lawyer-
client interactions.  See, e.g., BINDER, BERGMAN, PRICE & TREMBLAY, supra note 94, at 
34-38, 287, 395; JOHN M.A. DIPIPPA, ROBERT F. COCHRAN & MARTHA M. PETERS, THE 
COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT INTERVIEWING AND 
COUNSELING (2d ed. 2006); STEFAN H. KRIEGER & RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., 
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read to assume that clients are largely fungible.  Jacobs persuades her 
readers they assuredly are not, and that dimensions of class, race, gender, 
and ethnicity influence the attorney-client conversation in important ways. 
Jacobs’s homage to cultural competence as a critical lawyering skill 
supports, rather than undercuts, the central client-centeredness 
commitments, as long as those commitments include a robust and 
contextual understanding of the client and her community.  The theme of 
cross-cultural awareness appears frequently throughout Carle’s book.  The 
essay by Christine Zuni Cruz108 emphasizes her special connections to her 
Pueblo community and its traditions and sources of meaning.  The 
excerpts from Lani Guinier,109 Angela Harris,110 Bill Ong Hing,111 Victor 
Hwang,112 Phyllis Goldfarb,113 and Rob Atkinson114 each reflect, albeit in 
different ways, the importance of attending to race, ethnicity, gender, 
culture, and class in the development of effective lawyering theory. 
One last client-centeredness complication presented by Carle’s book 
deserves some attention.  The selections presented in the book when read 
together highlight the contrast between crude notions of client-centered 
lawyering and more thoughtful conceptions of lawyering strategy and 
argument, as developed in the essays by Lucie White and Binny Miller.  
As they relate to strategic decisionmaking, the crude formulations look 
something like this: lawyers best understand the risks and implications 
arising from lawyering alternatives, but responsibility for selecting among 
those alternatives must rest with the client who best understands his risk-
aversion, preferences, “values,” and the like.  The lawyer’s assigned 
undertaking is to describe, neutrally (lest she unnecessarily influence the 
client), the terrain, the alternatives, and the likely consequences of the 
representation, and to assist the client to make choices based on the 
client’s personal predilections.  The lawyer’s job therefore includes “the 
identification and assessment of alternatives and consequences, and 
assist[ing] client[s] in making decisions based on [the clients’] unique 
priorities, values and objectives.”115  Absent some morally unacceptable 
ambitions by the client, each actor in this relationship has a clearly 
defined, and separate, role to play. 
Lucie White and Binny Miller, adherents of a “collaborative” model of 
lawyering, complicate this elegant if sterile role-assignment scheme.  They 
                                                                                                                         
ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS: INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING, NEGOTIATION, AND 
PERSUASIVE FACT ANALYSIS 49-57 (2d ed. 2003). 
108.  Cruz, supra note 45. 
109.  Guinier, supra note 61. 
110.  Harris, supra note 52. 
111.  Hing, supra note 57. 
112.  Hwang, supra note 46. 
113.  Goldfarb, supra note 28. 
114.  Atkinson, supra note 67, at 326. 
115.  Laura Cohen & Randi Mandelbaum, Kids Will Be Kids:  Creating a Framework 
for Interviewing and Counseling Adolescent Clients, TEMP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006). 
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complicate the role designations in a way characteristic of so many essays 
in Carle’s book—by introducing the contexts and contingencies of class, 
race, culture, sexual orientation, and power dynamics, reflected in the 
client’s (and his or her community’s) narrative.  Carle offers us Lucie 
White’s evocative story of the welfare fraud hearing for Mrs. G., a black 
mother of five children,116 and Binny Miller’s compelling account of her 
students’ representation of Jay, a black (and gay?) man charged with the 
crime of resisting arrest after a shoplifting allegation.117  Both narratives 
engender conflicting notions of lawyering and client autonomy that may 
perplex student readers. 
The White and Miller excerpts demolish the neat role distinctions just 
described.  Lucy White's essay describes a true encounter in which she, as 
a legal services lawyer, and Mrs. G, as White's client, prepared for and 
attended a welfare hearing.  The essay illustrates the limits of sensitive, 
client-focused advocacy.  Despite her lawyer’s creative and thoughtful 
legal strategies, Mrs. G. defied the dictates of her role as “client,” and 
supplied her own theory of the case at the hearing.  One of White's claims 
is that, as she writes, “Mrs. G. was a better strategist than the lawyer—
more daring, more subtle, more fluent—in her home terrain.”118  White’s 
narrative extols collaborative lawyering, but also unsettles any simplified 
visions of that alliance.  Particularly interesting is White’s message that 
collaborative lawyering may serve both the end of client empowerment 
and the goal of effective legal advocacy.119
Miller’s story is similarly ambiguous and disquieting for adherents of a 
simplified client-centeredness approach.  Miller “urge[s] lawyers to set 
aside their own stories in favor of client stories,”120 and to “incorporat[e] 
client narratives in litigation,”121 especially into what clinical teachers 
                                                 
116.  White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 38, at 157. 
117.  Miller, supra note 39, at 169. 
118.  White, Sunday Shoes, supra note 38, at 167. 
119.  White's story and analysis are ambiguous about a seemingly important 
instrumental consideration.  White recounts that Mrs. G. flaunted White's careful if 
conventional strategic planning in favor of her own tactics, and as noted in the text, 
White admires Mrs. G.'s nimble read of the terrain.  White also reports that Mrs. G. 
ultimately won her hearing in the end (after losing before the official who presided at the 
hearing).  An implication from the Sunday Shoes story is that a collaborative lawyer will 
respect her client's choices and win more cases as a result.  It is not hard to imagine a 
dissenting argument—that the collaborative approach instead offers a poignant trade-off 
between those two goals.  The lawyer may be instrumentally better trained to manipulate 
mainstream legal processes, but her technical training may lead her to misrepresent her 
client's life and diminish the client's power in the process.  I developed that point in an 
earlier article.  See Paul R. Tremblay, A Tragic View of Poverty Law Practice, 1 D.C. L. 
Rev. 123, 126-27, 129 (1992). 
120.  Miller, supra note 39, at 169. 
121.  Id. at 170. 
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describe as developing a persuasive theory of the case.122  In assessing her 
client’s case, Miller offers insightful reflections about how her students’ 
understanding of the role of race, and perhaps of sexual orientation, in the 
client’s story can make the litigation arguments much more persuasive, 
while acknowledging that her client had chosen not to present that 
particular case theory.  While urging lawyer reticence toward imposing 
narratives on clients and constructing litigation themes for them, Miller 
implies that her client might have benefited from the insights that she and 
her students had developed about his case.123  Although White’s essay 
suggests the prospect that clients’ strategic choices might be more 
effective as litigation devices than their lawyers’ ideas (a contention which 
law students paying $40,000 per year for three years of training will surely 
resist), Miller’s essay appears more conflicted on that score. 
Like White’s earlier piece in Carle’s book,124 and the essays by 
Mack,125 Harris,126 and Goldfarb,127 the Mrs. G. and Jay stories evoke the 
interplay of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and oppression on 
ordinary lawyering theories and teachings.  While championing the role of 
client narrative in everyday legal case development, these excerpts 
provoke important questions about the instrumental implications of doing 
so.  The simplified teachings of the crude client-centeredness models may 
                                                 
122.  Traditional clinical training has emphasized the importance of developing a 
"theory of the case" around which to organize strategic planning.  See, e.g., GARY 
BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL 
INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY 273-429 (1978); John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-
Centered Representation: What Is a True Believer to Do When His Two Favorite 
Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 85, 105-06 (1999); Albert J. Moore, Inferential 
Streams: The Articulation and Illustration of the Trial Advocate's Evidentiary Intuitions, 
34 UCLA L. REV. 611 (1987).  Miller makes clear her goal of developing effective 
lawyering theory, one that does not lose sight of the trier of fact: 
My aim is to articulate a theory of case theory that is truer to the 
client’s life experience and to what it is that lawyers actually do.  By 
defining case theory as an explanatory statement linking the case to the 
client’s experience of the world, we create a context for seeing what we 
might not otherwise see. . . . Case theory makes actions seem quite 
reasonable that at first seemed unreasonable, and it allows us to accept 
the client’s story and at the same time have a plausible explanation for 
other stories. 
Miller, supra note 39, at 176.  Miller's assertions may depart from White's claims about 
the instrumental effectiveness of the collaboration. See supra note 20. 
123.  Miller, supra note 39, at 177 (“Why did [Jay] tell a story at the trial that avoided 
the question of race?  If we had discussed these issues, Jay might have been more hopeful 
about his case or might have better understood the implications of a race theory.”). 
124.  See White, Seeking the Faces of Otherness, supra note 20, at 44-45. 
125.  Mack, supra note 25, at 97. 
126.  Harris, supra note 52, at 283. 
127.  Goldfarb, supra note 28, at 304-05. 
 
 
24 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [VOL. 20:0000 
 
be easier for students to learn, but the lessons from the essays by White 
and Miller strike me as more genuine. 
B.  REBELLIOUS/COMMUNITY LAWYERING 
A second cross-current running throughout Carle’s book is that of 
“rebellious,” or community, lawyering.  Students of legal ethics in a 
conventional classroom setting are unlikely to encounter the conception of 
community lawyering because it is a developing (and contested) theory 
not closely connected to typical private law firm practice.128  Even 
students learning legal ethics within clinical programs may not confront 
literature describing the phenomenon.129  Carle’s book therefore offers 
students an important introduction to this progressive notion of lawyering. 
In conventional conceptions of the lawyer/client interaction, the 
lawyer serves as a helpful expert who aims to solve a client’s problems 
using the lawyer’s hard-earned proficiency in the specialized world of law, 
regulation, and procedure.  Client-centered lawyers use that proficiency in 
ways directed largely by their clients.  Progressive lawyers often operate 
in that same fashion, but with a goal of protecting civil rights or resisting 
oppressive state or corporate powers, even if the client is not paying for 
the legal services.  Whether progressive or mainstream, client-centered or 
lawyer-directed, the interaction looks as one would expect, with a client 
hiring a lawyer to accomplish some defined goal that is important to the 
client. 
In contrast, the community or rebellious lawyering conception 
disclaims this ordinary understanding.  As introduced most prominently by 
Gerald López,130 but explored by a host of other critical scholars,131 
community lawyering refuses to privilege the individual client as the 
source of direction for the lawyer or as the one who can alone define the 
goals of the legal representation.  This model also refuses to privilege 
legal strategy as the product of the working relationship between lawyers 
and their clients.  Rather, community lawyering, as its name implies, urges 
lawyers to respect the energy and the commitments of community 
members working together and to collaborate with them for meaningful 
                                                 
128.  Most professional responsibility casebooks do not address this aspect of critical 
lawyering.  One exception is the casebook by Deborah Rhode and David Luban, which 
addresses these tensions within public interest law and excerpts articles by Shauna 
Marshall and Stephen Wexler.  See DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 
846-53,862-71 (4th ed. 2004) (excerpting Marshall, supra note 2, and Wexler, supra note 
5). 
129.  Only one textbook developed for clinical courses includes any serious exposure to 
community or rebellious lawyering.  See CLINICAL ANTHOLOGY, supra note 7. 
130.  López, supra note 43. 
131.  See, e.g., Anthony Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 2; Cummings & Eagly, supra 
note 2; Gabel & Harris, supra note 53; William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community 
Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 455 (1994). 
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change, emerging from political and grass-roots movements rather than 
from clever advocacy efforts by smart lawyers in suits.  López calls the 
well-meaning, instrumental lawyer-driven work produced by progressive 
lawyers on behalf of disadvantaged clients “regnant lawyering.”132  In his 
view, regnant lawyering is certainly good, but rebellious lawyering is a far 
more effective way for lawyers to work with subordinated populations.133
Carle’s book is certainly not a “rebellious” treatise; it does not aim to 
present community lawyering as the preferred way lawyers ought to 
practice with disadvantaged communities.  The readings Carle presents in 
this section include many suggestions which could fairly be considered 
"regnant."  But Carle offers her student readers some beginning 
understandings about this orientation.  Her book provides enough of a 
taste to inspire some healthy curiosity about this model while at the same 
time, and inevitably, leaving a number of questions unexplored. 
Carle offers community lawyering lessons directly through three 
essays explicitly labeled as such, and indirectly through allusions in other 
readings.  The López excerpt134 provides a lively, entertaining overview of 
the kind of lawyer who works in a rebellious way but goes no further than 
that.135  The essays by Cruz136 and Hwang137 present examples of 
lawyering within and for disadvantaged communities, but neither fits 
exactly what I believe López envisions in his piece as true community 
lawyering.  Cruz acknowledges that "[c]ommunity lawyers grapple with 
the tension between 'zealous representation' of individual clients and 
community concerns,"138 but the short excerpt in Carle’s book offers no 
rich example of lawyering (or organizing) work where a powerful 
community need trumps an individual client's interests or wishes—which I 
understand to be what Cruz refers to as the "tension" of community 
lawyering.139  At the same time, Cruz's essay underscores the importance, 
as noted in the Jacobs essay,140 of cultural competence and sensitivity. 
                                                 
132.  López, supra note 43, at 193. 
133.  Id. at 196. 
134.  Id.  
135.  López's book, of course, explores those lawyers' practices in great depth.  See 
LÓPEZ, supra note 7. 
136.  Cruz, supra note 45, at 205. 
137.  Hwang, supra note 46. 
138.  Cruz, supra note 45, at 205. 
139.  Cruz does offer an example that implies a sacrifice of personal interests in favor 
of community interests.  She describes a jurisdictional tension between the state courts of 
New Mexico and the Pueblos' tribal court system over family law matters.  The tribal 
court system will not provide for divorce decrees, but only legal separation orders, for 
well-entrenched cultural and faith grounds.  Cruz reports that her legal clinic has a policy 
(which seems to be firm and independent of any individual client desire) not to use the 
state courts for any family law result except to accomplish the divorce order which is 
unavailable in the tribal courts.  Limiting access to the state court system affords the 
clinic's clients some justice "with the greatest respect being accorded to exclusive tribal 
jurisdiction."  Id. at 208.  Cruz observes: "The Pueblo stance on not providing for divorce 
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Hwang's essay describes wonderfully creative, energetic, but perhaps 
regnant lawyering, if we apply López's definition of that phenomenon.  
His essay vividly captures, even if it does not (in Carle’s excerpt, at least) 
develop or try to resolve, some of the conflicts inherent in the rebellious 
stance.  At times, Hwang writes skeptically of the rebellious scholars: 
The problem is that while we can debate the intangible but 
real harms caused by the chasm between progressive 
theorists and practitioners, we cannot ignore the daily 
injuries done to our communities by orchestrated assaults 
on their rights and by barriers to the pursuit of legal 
recourse.  Families that are being unlawfully evicted, 
working in hazardous sweatshops, facing deportation, or 
being denied basic life-sustaining benefits do not care 
whether the change is temporary or systemic.  They are 
concerned with the realities of food shelter, health and 
employment.141
This passage represents the deepest triage-driven critique of the 
rebellious stance—that lawyers who work for the long-term mobilization 
of the community must ineluctably sacrifice the short-term needs of those 
community members.142  If Hwang sounds rather regnant in the passage 
just quoted, he seems not to want that label as evidenced by his later 
admiration for López's rebellious ideas and his effort to connect those 
ideas to the narrative he shares.143   
Hwang presents a rich story of lawyering, organizing, and legislative 
lobbying with and on behalf of the Hmong community to change certain 
federal Social Security and welfare laws which excluded many disabled 
Hmong immigrants from income and health care benefits.  His narrative 
serves as a provocative exemplar from which to evaluate the competing 
lawyering theories running throughout Carle’s textbook.  On the one hand, 
the creative work Hwang describes seems quite lawyer-driven; on the 
other hand, because it engaged substantial community input, relying on 
protests and similar mobilization efforts within the Hmong neighborhoods, 
                                                                                                                         
is deeply embedded in religion, yet the need for individual relief cannot be ignored.  It 
presents a classic conflict of community and individual interests . . . ."  Id.   
140.  Jacobs, supra note 40. 
141.  Hwang, supra note 46, at 211. 
142.  See Gabel & Harris, supra note 53, at 234-35 (suggesting that long-run gains 
ought to be preferred over the short-term benefits of instrumental lawyering work).  For a 
description of the triage-based worry, see Paul R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, 
Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947, 963 (1992).  
Hwang's ideas remind us, as Cruz noted above, that community lawyering is not 
necessarily consistent with the commitment to client-centeredness.  See Cruz, supra note 
45, at 205. 
143.  Hwang, supra note 46, at 211-12. 
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the action appears very community-driven.  In the end, the grass-roots 
campaign effected some significant change in federal legislation and 
regulation, which sounds regnant given its focus on changing discrete 
substantive law.144  At the same time, the Hmong struggle with 
Washington legislators and bureaucrats may serve as a satisfying example 
of the best of community lawyering, because of its reliance not on 
arguments made by honey-tongued lawyers to judges but instead on 
organized political pressures from the community members themselves.145  
In this way, Hwang's essay serves as a valuable resource through which 
student readers can begin to appreciate and critique the conception of 
rebellious lawyering and its contrasts to good, effective, instrumental 
regnant work. 
The community lawyering themes found in Carle's book highlight one 
more tension, which I will describe briefly before moving on.  I noted 
above that a rebellious, community lawyering stance is not always 
comfortably client-centered.  Long-term community goals are not always 
congruent with short-term community residents' interests.  Conflicts 
inevitably arise within the community, calling for accommodation and 
reconciliation on the part of lawyers and leaders.  Lawyers must choose 
some members within the community with whom to work, as good faith 
representatives of the larger membership.  Choosing some, of course, 
means excluding others.  The simplified construct of a lawyer neutrally 
respecting the autonomy and values of her client therefore ill fits the more 
nuanced work life of a community lawyer. 
Readers of Carle’s collection of essays will appreciate those tensions.  
The uncomfortable interplay between respect for client wishes and 
protection of community interests is especially well evoked in the excerpt 
from Derrick Bell’s memorable article, described earlier in this Review, 
which criticized desegregation lawyers in the 1960s and 1970s for 
pursuing litigation strategies with which at least some members of the 
black community disagreed.146  Bell’s essay is powerful and trenchant, but 
its central argument—that the NAACP lawyers should have exhibited 
greater respect for what Bell calls “the client’s current interests” when 
they differed from “the long range good of [the lawyers’] clients”147—is 
                                                 
144.  See Gabel & Harris, supra note 53, at 230 (describing how regnant lawyers (but 
not using that term, as the authors wrote before López) "discover that the expansion of 
legal rights has only a limited impact on people's lives, and that even those limited gains 
can be wiped out by a change in the political climate"). 
145.  See Bellow & Kettleson, supra note 34, at 140 ("In the long run, public interest 
lawyers cannot win such games [of litigating for marginal victories] for their clients.  
Political organization and activity by disadvantaged groups will be necessary to maintain, 
expand, and assure full implementation of any benefits and rights that lawyers might 
establish."). 
146.  Bell, supra note 33.  Bell's essay is found not within the client-centeredness or the 
community lawyering subchapters of the book, but instead in the historical section. 
147.  Id. at 134. 
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not sufficiently developed or defended in the short selection in the book 
given the power of available responses to it.148  Careful readers of Carle’s 
book will note the richness of the tensions raised by Bell and relate them 
to the competing arguments and reflections presented by several other 
authors in the collection. 
C.  MORAL ACTIVISM 
A third recurring theme in Carle’s textbook is that of moral activism.  
The notion that a good lawyer has a professional responsibility to attend to 
justice and fairness concerns in her work, and not solely to the wishes and 
interests of her own client, appears as a topic of discussion, centrally or 
otherwise, in at least 19 of the 40 essays in Carle’s book.  Virtually all of 
the discussion of this conception appears in a favorable light.  One 
therefore comes away from a reading of the anthology with the 
understanding that moral activism tends to be a progressive orientation—
that the left, by and large, supports an activist stance and, by implication, 
that the right would likely defend a more individualist, client-focused 
stance, committed to zealous advocacy, moral nonaccountability, and 
neutral partisanship.  Although that perception may not be a terribly 
controversial one,149 it is probably an imperfect one.150
                                                 
148.  To the extent that Bell argues that the NAACP lawyers chased their own glory 
with little regard to the interests—long term or short—of the client community generally 
(see id. at 129 (noting Dr. Andrew Watson’s worry of the influence of “‘narcissistic 
gratification’” on the work of public interest lawyers)), then his critique is of course a 
straightforward one.  But from the excerpt presented here, the landscape is plainly more 
complicated than that.  If the lawyers (and the NAACP) believed in good faith that the 
long term interests of the black communities were better served by their desegregation 
strategy even over the opposition of some present members of that same community, it is 
not at all self-evident that the latter interests ought to trump the former, or that the 
lawyers should not have respected the views of the NAACP leadership.  For a discussion 
of this point, see Tremblay, Triage Among Poor Clients, supra note 84, at 2477-79.  For a 
recent revisionist historical review of the lawyering and political stances of pre-Brown 
black lawyers, see Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in 
the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005). 
Bell’s essay, as presented here, also leaves readers with some unresolved questions as 
he critiques the role of the bar and professional regulators in discouraging the kind of 
overreaching about which he worries.  Bell argues that an approach found in the former 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, “urging the lawyer to ‘constantly guard 
against the erosion of his professional freedom’ and requiring that he ‘decline to accept 
direction of his professional judgment from any layman,’ is simply the wrong answer” to 
the problem of lawyer overreaching.  Such admonitions, in Bell's words, are “difficult to 
enforce.”  Bell, supra note 33, at 133-34.  A few paragraphs later, though, Bell offers his 
own suggestion, that “civil rights lawyers come to realize that the special status accorded 
them by the courts and the bar demands in return an extraordinary display of ethical 
sensitivity and self-restraint.”  Id. at 134-35.  Readers of this excerpt may find it hard to 
reconcile Bell’s Model Code criticism with his own, equally unenforceable, proposal. 
149.  Among the most prominent moral activist scholars are David Luban, Deborah 
Rhode and William Simon, all comfortably progressive in their lawyering theory 
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Student readers of this book may not sufficiently appreciate how 
contested the notion of moral activism remains among thoughtful scholars 
of legal ethics and lawyering theory, although admittedly some objections 
to moral activism do surface in a few of the essays.  Upon reading the 
book students may also under-appreciate some of the complications about 
what it means to adopt the activist stance in day-to-day practice, and to 
live this philosophy as a lawyer—although the delightful essay by David 
Luban covers some of that ground.151
Carle’s collection canvasses historical debates about the prominence, 
or not, of “civic republican” visions of professional responsibility (which I 
read as a variety of moral activism152) in the legal profession of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.153  She includes two essays 
demonstrating how the writers’ religious commitments and teachings 
support their discomfort with an individualist, zeal-driven lawyering 
ethos.154  Two other essays attempt to apply an activist orientation in a 
practical way to the ethical challenges presented by the recent corporate 
scandals such as Enron.155  Another captivating, but at the same time 
somewhat perplexing, essay connects the activist debate (with some 
                                                                                                                         
scholarship.  See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 7; RHODE, supra note 7; Deborah L. Rhode, 
Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985); SIMON, supra note 
7; Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 54.  By contrast, an early pioneer of the neutral 
partisanship formulation (which resists moral activism) was Charles Fried, a noted 
conservative scholar, former Republican administration official, and former Justice of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.  See generally Charles Fried, The Lawyer as 
Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 
(1976). 
150.  One thinks, for instance, of progressive critics of moral activism such as Stephen 
Ellmann, Abbe Smith, and Bradley Wendel.  See, e.g., Stephen Ellmann, Lawyering for 
Justice in a Flawed Democracy, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 116 (1990) (reviewing LUBAN, , 
supra note 7, and resisting many of its activist arguments); MONROE H. FREEDMAN & 
ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS  (2d ed. 2002) (defending a zealous, 
partisan posture); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and 
Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67 (2005) [hereinafter Wendel, Separation of Law and 
Morals]; W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 364, 399 
(2004) [hereinafter Wendel, Civil Obedience] (developing what he terms the "authority 
conception," a form of "'wide' positivism" which may support much of the "loophole 
lawyering" decried by role critics).  The Anthony Alfieri essay included in this book 
contains some oblique criticism of William Simon’s activism from this critical scholar as 
well.  Alfieri, Ethic of Justice, supra note 58, at 266-68. 
151.  See Luban, supra note 9. 
152.  See supra note 28. 
153.  See Gordon, Independence of Lawyers, supra note 31; Pearce, Rediscovering 
Republican Origins, supra note 29; Spaulding, supra note 30; Spillenger, supra note 32. 
154.  See Carter, supra note 69, at 329; Pearce, Jewish Lawyer’s Question, supra note 
70, at 340. 
155.  See Gordon, Corporate Counselor, supra note 76; Luban, supra note 9. 
 
 
30 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [VOL. 20:0000 
 
development of the nonaccountability position) to the moral tensions 
developed in Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel The Remains of the Day.156
Carle’s book includes one essay directly aimed at articulating and 
defending one version of the activist project—William Simon’s defense of 
a lawyer’s professional duty to exercise “ethical discretion” and to seek 
justice.157  However, the book does not include any scholarship directly 
arguing the opposite proposition.158  Two essays on topics other than 
activism pointedly disagree with Simon’s thesis, but neither in a very 
elaborate or even very persuasive way.159  The result of all this is that 
                                                 
156.  Atkinson, supra note 67.  Here is why I describe Atkinson’s piece as 
“perplexing,” at least as it gets excerpted here.  Atkinson seems rightly critical of 
Stevens, the butler in the Ishiguro novel (think Anthony Hopkins here), whose 
commitment to his role responsibilities permits him to carry out the order from his 
employer, Lord Darlington, that he fire the two Jewish servants working on the 
employer's estate, because the servants are Jewish.  He compares Steven’s reasoning in 
the novel to that of the supporters of neutral partisanship in lawyering theory.  Id. at 321.  
Atkinson is evidently more sympathetic to the posture of Steven’s compatriot, the former 
head housekeeper Kenton (think Emma Thomson), who voices her outrage at Steven’s 
bureaucratic response to what she recognizes as clear injustice.  Atkinson likens her 
response to that of the moral activists.  Id. at 324-25.  The fictional account, then, sets the 
stage for some lessons about lawyers' duties.  In assessing the “two competing 
approaches open to contemporary American lawyers in such a situation,” Atkinson 
concludes that “[e]ither answer, standing alone, is inadequate, but the story itself presents 
a more satisfactory, but no means perfect, response. . . . [But] Stevens and Kenton failed 
to choose that alternative.”  Id. at 320.  Intriguing, right?  But the excerpt here does not 
depict the unchosen, “more satisfactory,” alternative.  The most apparent reading is that 
Atkinson refers to the telling of stories itself as the "more satisfactory" alternative he 
prefers.  In that case, readers are left without a convincing explication of exactly how the 
telling of stories affects (or effects) the moral landscape—and, notably, the moral 
decision-making—inherent in the order from Lord Darlington. 
157.  Simon, Ethical Discretion, supra note 54. 
158.  The extensive literature on activism versus neutral partisanship reads something 
like an ongoing, sophisticated contest of ideas.  For one early, noteworthy point-
counterpoint presentation of that contest, see Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral 
Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 
613 (1986); David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper, 
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637 (1987).  In recent years, Bradley Wendel has added a 
deeply thoughtful, intricate, and quite philosophical perspective to this conversation.  See 
Wendel, Civil Obedience, supra note 150; Wendel, Separation of Law and Morals, supra 
note 150. 
159.  See Dinerstein, supra note 37, at 156 (criticizing Simon’s proposal for its 
encouragement of lawyers’ “imposing values” on clients and for “fail[ing] to provide a 
satisfactory answer to the problem of lawyer power”).  Simon’s defenders would disagree 
with Dinerstein's critique.  The only “values” Simon suggests lawyers ought to pursue are 
those of legitimate legal merits; anything resembling “imposition” occurs only when 
clients wish their lawyers to take advantage of system failures to achieve illegitimate 
gains; see also Alfieri, Ethic of Justice, supra note 58, at 268 (accusing Simon of “a 
crabbed notion of the ‘public dimension’ of client-group loyalty” of “offer[ing] little 
guidance in the effort to reintegrate [the values of family, group and community] into a 
richer conception of other-regarding loyalty relevant to the support of ‘third party and 
public interests,’” of “reinvigorati[ng] ... the vitality of legal liberalism,” and of idealizing 
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Carle’s book is generally supportive of a justice-driven, activist stance for 
lawyers, highlighted frequently in many essays but not subjected to 
serious, reflective scrutiny.  Given the inevitable compromises that any 
compilation such as this will reflect, as its editor aims for a comprehensive 
but also manageable reader,160 Carle’s selection and editing choices may 
have been the very best available.  Intrigued but skeptical students will 
easily find a trove of insightful scholarship on the activist project and, if a 
book such as this spurs a serious investigation into the merits of that 
project, it is hard to be unhappy with Carle’s approach. 
IV.  SITUATING CARLE'S BOOK IN THE CURRICULUM 
I end this Review with a few thoughts about how Carle’s valuable 
book might find its way into the hands of law students.  First, it is worth 
emphasizing that this book does deserve a prominent place within the law 
school curriculum.  Carle notes in her introduction that the book should 
serve as a versatile, relatively inexpensive supplement to, rather than 
replacement for, a traditional legal ethics or professional responsibility 
casebook for use in a conventional legal ethics course.161  I hope Carle is 
right but worry that her aspirations may be too ambitious.  My concern, of 
course, is that her book is too rich and too intricate to fit that bill.  In light 
of the many themes the book seeks to cover and to connect with one other, 
it will be rather challenging for students to appreciate its nuances if they 
read selected passages as a break from the doctrinal law of lawyering 
found in more traditional legal ethics casebooks.  Given the increasing 
complexity of the doctrinal developments within the field of lawyer 
regulation and liability, it is hard to imagine that this book will earn the 
consideration it deserves as an add-on to the usual lessons covered in a 
traditional legal ethics course.162  It would, however, be wonderful to 
                                                                                                                         
the lawyer who “may simply reenact his own private moral preference at the expense of a 
client-community participatory resolution”).  Alfieri’s criticism is harder to assess, if only 
because Alfieri's writing is itself more difficult to follow and understand fully.  Simon’s 
purposivist proposals may reinvigorate liberal legalism, see supra note 55, but his notion 
of justice may incorporate more community norms than Alfieri is willing to concede.  See 
William H. Simon, A Brief Rejoinder to Comments on the Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. 
L. REV. 991, 1003-04 (1999) [hereinafter Simon, A Brief Rejoinder] (responding to 
Alfieri's criticism); West, supra note 55, at 982-84 (crediting Simon with a broader view 
of “legal merits” than implied here). 
160.  Its editor tells us she agrees wholeheartedly.  See LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, 
at 7 (“The hardest part of editing this book has been deciding what to leave out.”). 
161.  Id. at 6.  Robert Gordon echoes that sentiment in his Foreword.  See Gordon, 
Foreword, supra note 87, at xv. 
162.  Here’s one teacher’s story:  I have taught this semester a three credit classroom 
course (four if a student elects to write a separate paper) called simply Professional 
Responsibility.  My students read the newest edition of Stephen Gillers’s bountiful and 
witty casebook.  See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW 
AND ETHICS (7th ed. 2005).  I have found it difficult to cover in a three-credit course 
enough of the developing doctrine governing the legal profession, including expanding 
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accomplish that feat, and, as the legal academy is full of talented teachers, 
I do not wish to discourage anyone willing to try. 
My sense is that Carle’s book fits more comfortably in two other 
settings in law school.  The first, and more obvious one, is for use in a 
specialized seminar or classroom course, perhaps called something like 
“Legal Ethics and the Pursuit of Social Justice.”  A professor teaching 
such a course could easily use Carle’s book to introduce students to 
virtually all of the significant intellectual and political visions developed 
by critical scholars of legal ethics over the past few decades.  The 
professor could effectively use Carle’s book in conjunction with the full 
text of some of the essays or other related readings—which Carle’s 
Appendix helpfully references.163  That’s a seminar I would love to teach, 
and indeed would love to take.  The other potentially well-suited use for 
this book is in the seminar component of a clinical course, especially in 
clinics that aim to teach students as much about the broad themes of a 
lawyer’s role, ethics, and justice as they do about substantive law or skills 
training.  When considering this book as a supplement in a clinical setting, 
some risks inevitably arise: namely, that the richness of the readings and 
their interrelatedness might call for more in-depth discussion than the 
clinic seminar might ordinarily permit.  However, while a more traditional 
legal ethics course will tend to cover much doctrine and regulation that is 
absent from Carle’s anthology, the curriculum of many clinic courses is 
likely to focus on precisely the issues presented so well in Carle’s book. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Lawyers’ Ethics and the Pursuit of Social Justice: A Critical Reader is 
impressive both in its scope and in its elegance.  Carle presents a rich 
compilation of insightful and innovative scholarship in a way that is at 
once accessible and challenging.  Her book is therefore a welcome 
addition to the prolific field of scholarship about progressive legal ethics 
and lawyering theories.  The book is more directly relevant to students' 
inquiries about these theories and models than are some of the more 
sociologically or philosophically focused collections that address cause 
lawyering.  And, thanks to Carle's careful editing this book is more 
approachable than many others covering similar themes.  Its limitations 
are apparent and not unexpected.  Carle has chosen breadth over depth, 
and it is hard to quibble with that judgment call.  Readers new to the 
contested terrain concerning progressive lawyering will come away from 
this book with many unanswered questions, some vigorous skepticism, 
and, importantly, a hunger for a deeper understanding of the complexities 
                                                                                                                         
liability theories, multijurisdictional and multidisciplinary practice innovations, Sarbanes-
Oxley implications, and so forth.  Adding enough of Carle's book to do it justice in a 
course like mine would be challenging, it seems. 
163.  LAWYERS’ ETHICS, supra note 8, at 385-98.  
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of good and noble lawyering.  Those readers will perhaps be more 
disquieted after reading this book than before, but they will be more 
enlightened and more wise. 
 
 
